THE BRIEFING 

It’s been a long day, so I won’t go into a detailed breakdown of every strike location — with exchanges still ongoing, much of that information will be outdated within hours anyway.

What I will do tonight is provide insight into some of the strategies I’ve noticed over the last few hours. It’s clear that both Israel and Iran studied the 12-day war closely, learned from it, and adapted accordingly.

Let’s begin with the USA and Israel


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DAILY DEEP DIVE

STRATEGIC ANALYSIS OF THE
FIRST FEW HOURS

USA / ISRAEL

Offensive Capabilities
Unlike the 12-day operation, according to various insider sources, the level of coordination with the U.S. military is significantly higher. Early reports suggested the initial strikes were purely Israeli, but it was quickly confirmed this was a highly integrated Israeli-U.S. campaign.

Detonations were reported across Tehran as the operation unfolded, with initial accounts indicating around 30 sites struck in the first phase. Reported targets included senior leadership residences, intelligence-linked facilities, and offices allegedly connected to the Supreme Leader. The pattern suggests deliberate high-value targeting rather than broad-area bombardment.

This suggests that the primary objective in the opening phase was a decapitation strike, removing key officials early. According to Israeli media, the Supreme Leader, the Iranian Defence Minister, and a Guards commander may be dead. These reports remain unconfirmed, but the targeting profile itself signals intent.

This is a notable shift from last year. Trump had been adamant about not killing Khamenei and publicly ruled out assassination options. Yet here we are less than a year later, and his official compound has reportedly been destroyed by cruise missiles. Politically, it’s clear the Iranian leadership doubled down on its own red lines after this year’s protests were quelled, with the military apparatus remaining firm behind the Supreme Leader. That consolidation may have removed hesitation in Washington,  and certainly in Jerusalem.

We also saw operational changes. Unlike the 12-Day War, which began under cover of darkness, this campaign started early in the morning — on the first working day of Iran’s calendar week. Dr. Azizi believes this detail is operationally significant. Early-morning strikes increase administrative disruption, heighten leadership exposure during routine transitions, and compress reaction time across the security apparatus.

Dr Azizi Comments

The Israeli Chief of the General Staff stated:

“We are preparing for an operation of a completely different magnitude, far more complex and challenging.”

The strike profile clearly indicates a leadership-focused approach. Early waves appear directed at command structures and internal security organs rather than concentrating exclusively on conventional military platforms. Targeting the decision-making core can generate cascading effects across the system. Now we are seeing airstrikes and missile strikes on military facilities across the country. From launchpad locations to AD systems and more. I did wonder if we would see the new U.S. kamikaze drones that we saw in Caracas — and yes, according to CNN they have been used in these strikes. Electronic warfare systems are also prevalent but the extent unknown.

If we pause and ignore the obvious political implications for a moment, focusing purely on the operational aspect, it becomes clear why Israel would prioritise a decapitation strike instead of first targeting military installations. Removing key decision-making figures can delay retaliation, paralyse response coordination, and create windows of opportunity for follow-on strikes.

There is also the question of duration. Israel may prefer a shorter conflict. Last year, interceptor ammunition was running dangerously low, and even smaller Iranian salvos were penetrating defences. A decisive blow to leadership and coordination reduces the need for prolonged missile defence attrition.

Defensive Capabilities

On defence, priorities are clear: Israel first as with carrier fleets and deeper U.S. bases — forward bases less of an importance.

In the last 72 hours, the U.S. began evacuating air assets from Qatar, Kuwait, Bahrain, and the UAE — the bases closest to Iran and therefore the easiest targets with the shortest warning times. Most U.S. air assets were moved deeper into Israel, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan.

Why? Because distance equals time. The further a missile has to travel, the greater the response window and the higher the interception probability. Forward bases near the Strait of Hormuz and Iraq now function more as early detection and first-layer defence nodes, feeding data into a broader layered system.

A senior U.S. official told CNN that Washington structured the campaign as phased escalation, with successive waves lasting one to two days followed by pauses to assess damage and recalibrate. This suggests calibrated pressure rather than open-ended war. The built-in pauses act as strategic off-ramps depending on Tehran’s response. That said, the U.S. has positioned significant assets in theatre. This could easily extend for several weeks.

Also worth noting, no footage yet of Israeli operatives inside Iran. Too early to release? Or did Iran contain those operations quickly? Something to watch.

IRAN

Offensive Capabilities

Now regarding Iran, given they’re up against the largest regional military buildup since 2003, their response has been measured.

Extensive footage shows air defence engagements across Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, and the UAE — the forward bases closest to Iran. These locations house significant radar and surveillance infrastructure protected by Patriot systems. Analysis based on impact footage, sustained fires, and corroborating VIIRS thermal imagery suggests the primary target in Bahrain was Building 262 (CTF-55 / CDS-50 Headquarters) at Naval Support Activity Bahrain in Manama. The building is identifiable by rooftop satellite radomes and an adjacent geodesic dome, consistent with a NAVCENT command, control, and SATCOM node supporting U.S. Fifth Fleet operations across CENTCOM.
Source

Separately, a Qatari Defence Ministry official told Al Jazeera that an Iranian missile struck a long-range early warning radar site in northern Qatar, reportedly destroying the $1 billion AN/FPS-132 Block 5 system. There is currently no confirmed reporting on personnel status at either location. The apparent trend is a shift toward targeting high-value command, control, communications, and early-warning infrastructure rather than symbolic sites. If accurate, this suggests an effort to degrade situational awareness and compress response timelines across CENTCOM.

Iran has released launch footage (on our page) that OSINT analysts assess shows Ghadr-1 medium-range ballistic missiles. With a range of roughly 1,600–1,950 km, they can reach all of Israel and carry a 750–800 kg payload, with improved maneuverability compared to the Shahab-3. The missiles launched so far do not appear to be Iran’s most advanced precision systems. While variants like Ghadr and Emad incorporate guidance improvements, Iran may be sequencing older or less accurate platforms first before deploying higher-value assets. As seen last year, the most advanced systems were not revealed until later stages of the conflict.

What we may be witnessing is a coordinated effort to degrade early detection at forward bases, increasing the success probability of future salvos that could incorporate more modern systems. Over in Israel, however, Iran has not achieved major success so far. Israeli sources claim that damage from ballistic missile attacks is not significant and that no major military facilities have been hit. This should be treated cautiously but aligns with current available evidence.

Salvo sizes are also smaller than the opening stages of the last war. That could reflect rebuilding limitations, or Iran may be deliberately pacing its launches this time. Time will tell.

Shahed drones are now active. We did not see them in the earliest salvos, but they have reportedly caused damage in Bahrain. Regarding proxies, Hezbollah activity remains limited for now, though Iraqi militias have targeted a U.S. base in Erbil and the Houthis resumed Red Sea operations. I personally have my doubts over the overall strategic impact the proxies will make. Proxies work well when you are exporting soft power through hard power means – not when you are fighting an existential war on home soil. 

Important update: Iran has warned it considers all U.S. assets legitimate targets — not only airbases and fleets, but potentially economic infrastructure as well.

Defensive Capabilities
This is where the Iranian regime faces structural challenges.

Iran has historically struggled with integrated air defence. Its network is a mix of Chinese radars and Russian and domestically produced systems. During the 12-day war, it took several days to establish a layered defence, and even then, Israel achieved near-total air superiority over western Iran.

Now that same Israeli air capability is backed by U.S. airpower.

U.S. officials report multiple strikes already conducted against Iranian air defence and missile systems with relative and little pushback. If we look at a couple days ago,  satellite imagery recently showed an S-300 battery intact which disproves Israeli claims last year that all S300’s had been destroyed. But here's the catch, it has no radar –  without its radar system, rendering it effectively blind.

Footage appears to show MQ-9 drones operating over Shiraz. Like I said, during the last conflict, it took several days for Iran to mobilise short-range air defences and begin regularly downing drones. Given the heightened alert status over recent months, a repeat delay would raise serious questions about readiness. 

If Iran cannot secure its own airspace, sustaining missile operations becomes significantly more difficult. Iran has placed significant strategic emphasis on its missile arsenal, one of the largest in the region, stored in underground facilities across mountainous terrain. This offers survivability — using natural geography as protection. But this also comes with trade-offs. Once a launch entrance or platform is identified and destroyed, it becomes unusable. Last year, Iran could rely on eastern launch pads outside Israel’s operational reach. Now, with U.S. airpower involved, all of Iran is within range.

Chinese radar and satellite support may assist, but it is unlikely to fundamentally alter the balance and be the game changer many have been stating they would be. We have to consider training and integration amongst just a couple of the challenges. 

Regarding the reported decapitation — whether confirmed or not — Iran’s constitution includes contingency mechanisms for succession. Leadership loss would be destabilising, but not necessarily paralysing in the immediate term.

Final Comment

Trump’s remarks referencing Iranian protesters suggest regime change is at least rhetorically on the table. Whether that translates into new internal unrest ( organic or externally encouraged) remains to be seen.

Sources
News/Journal sources available upon request, not shown to maintain visual integrity of page.